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Civil Procedure-Requirement of Notice for Appointment of
Guardians Ad Litem and Next Friends
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Hagins v. Redevelopment
Commission1 recently set forth procedural requirements that substan-
tially affect the process of appointing guardians ad litem and next friends.
Under the rules laid down in this case, any person for whom a guardian
ad litem or next friend is proposed must be notified of such proposal
and be given an opportunity to be heard if there is objection to the ap-
pointment.
The case arose from the Greensboro Redevelopment Commission's
premature destruction of plaintiff Hagins' buildings pursuant to at-
tempts to condemn her land.2 Subsequent to the condemnation proceed-
ing, Mrs. Hagins instituted an action in the superior court against the
commission to recover 407,460 dollars as damages for the loss of her build-
ings. On the day set for trial Mrs. Hagins was unable to proceed with
the cause because she had fired her two attorneys after a dispute over
the litigation. The trial judge nonsuited her and informed her that she
had one year to re-institute the action. The two discharged attorneys
then filed affidavits alleging that Mrs. Hagins had a "fixation" about
the loss of her property and that she was incompetent to manage this
particular case. Acting in his discretion,' the trial judge thereafter va-
275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).On August 7, 1961, the commission instituted condemnation proceedings
against Mrs. Hagins' land in the Guilford Superior Court under section 160-454
of the North Carolina General Statutes. Mrs. Hagins filed a self-prepared answer
alleging her buildings were not dilapidated and the commission had no power to
condemn her land. The superior court upheld the commission's right of eminent
domain and adjudged title be transferred to the commission. Mrs. Hagins ap-
pealed and the North Carolina Supreme Court in Redevelopment Comm'n v.
Hagins, 258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962), reversed, holding that the commis-
sion's petitions were fatally defective. While that appeal was pending, on or
about May 24, 1962, the commission demolished the buildings. On January 14,
1963, the commission brought a second condemnation proceeding to acquire title
to Mrs. Hagins' lots. She was awarded 3,000 dollars as just compensation by the
jury in superior court and title was adjudged to have vested in the commission. The
supreme court, in Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins, 267 N.C. 622, 148 S.E.2d
585 (1966), affirmed the superior court decree and noted the pendency of Mrs.
Hagins' action for damages for the premature destruction of her buildings.
8 During a term of court all judgments and orders are in fieri and, except for
those entered by consent, may be opened, modified, or vacated by the court upon
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cated the nonsuit, continued the case for the term, and appointed a next
friend to manage the litigation for Mrs. Hagins pursuant to section
1-64 of the North Carolina General Statutes.4 All of this action was
taken without notice to the plaintiff. Mrs. Hagins first learned of the
judge's orders after the term had expired by reading about them in
a newspaper.
The next friend notified Mrs. Hagins of his appointment and of his
intention to ask the court to approve a forty-thousand-dollars settlement
and a one-thousand-dollars fee for his services. The superior court subse-
quently approved both of the next friend's recommendations and granted
judgment releasing the redevelopment commission from all liability. Sev-
eral months later, Mrs. Hagins filed a motion to vacate the appointment of
the next friend and all judgments entered thereafter. She contended that
her constitutional rights had been violated because she was sui juris and her
property had been taken without notice and a hearing. The superior court
denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed.5 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina the judgment was reversed with the
court acceding to Mrs. Hagins' contentions."
A next friend or prochien ami is appointed to bring or prosecute
some proceeding in behalf of a party under a disability while a guardian
ad litem is appointed only to defend,' but there is no substantial dif-
ference in the law between the two.' The most common disabilities
for which guardians ad litem and next friends are appointed are infancy
and incompetency.' At common law, the king was the general protector
its own motion. Shaver v. Shaver, 248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E.2d 791 (1958) ; Hoke v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 42 S.E.2d 407 (1947).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-64 (1967):
In actions and special proceedings when any of the parties plaintiff are
infants, idiots, lunatics, or persons non compos mentis, whether residents or
nonresidents of this state, they must appear by their general or testamentary
guardian, if they have any within the State; but if the action or proceeding
is against such guardian, or if there is no such guardian, then said person
may appear by their next friend.
'1 N.C. App. 40, 159 S.E.2d 584 (1968). The court based its affirmance on
the fact that both the vacation of the nonsuit and the appointment of the next
friend were ordered during the same term in which Mrs. Hagins brought the
action, thus "fixing" her with notice. The court also held that Mrs. Hagins had
actual notice of the actions from a phone conversation with the next friend. The
court said that an inquisition was not necessary to have a next friend appointed;
rather, the matter was within the discretion of the trial judge.
'Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 165 S.E.2d 490 (1969).
7 Johnson County v. Ellis, 226 N.C. 268, 38 S.E.2d 31 (1948).
844 C.J.S. Insave Persons § 140 (1945).
' However, statutes in many states provide for appointment of guardians ad
litem in other cases of disability. See e.g. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-883 (1947)
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of persons with disabilities."0 Consequently, when a person under a
disability needed assistance in court, the king issued a letter patent ap-
pointing a guardian." The chancery court later acquired jurisdiction
over infants and incompetents by a delegation of duty by the crown and
a grant of authority from the crown respectively. 12 American courts
were quick to adopt the English policy of protecting persons with dis-
abilities,'" but unlike the delegation of the power in England, the courts
of America recognized an inherent power to appoint guardians ad litem
and next friends to protect infants and incompetents.' 4
Guardians ad litem are special guardians' whose powers are co-
terminous with the beginning and ending of the particular litigation for
which they are appointed.' 6 Due to the limited nature of the guardian
ad litem's duties, rules governing them cannot be said to be a part of the
general law of guardianship ;17 however, the general rationale that moves
the courts to protect persons under disability by appointment of guardians
of the person or of the estate is also operative in the appointment of
guardians ad litem and next friends.'8 Still, the appointment of guardians
ad litem and next friends is more practically a matter of procedure since
state and federal rules of procedure normally control their appointment. 10
Under the North Carolina General Statutes, there are various sit-
uations in which next friends or guardians ad litem can be appointed.
Judges of superior courts can appoint next friends or guardians ad litem
for idiots, infants, lunatics, or persons non compos mentis when they
have no general guardian, 0 as occurred in Hagins. A guardian ad litem
may also be appointed by the court in actions where unborn persons
would have an interest if living;21 for non-existent corporations, trusts,
(guardian ad litem appointment for persons in prison); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-
2(c) (1966) (guardian ad litem appointment for missing persons in action to have
receiver appointed for the estate).
2 J. FONTBLANQUE, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 225 (2d Am. ed. 1820).
112 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, TiE HISTORY OF ENGLISHi LAW 441 n.6
(2d ed. 1911).
2 J. FONTBLANQUE, supra note 10, at 232.
"
8See, e.g., Kesler v. Penninger, 59 Ill. 134 (1871) ; Fisher v. Stilson, 9 Abb.
Pr. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859).
14 Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 438 (1880) (dictum) ; Zaro v. Strauss,
167 F.2d 218, 220 (5th Cir. 1948).Till v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405, 408 (10th Cir. 1941).16Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964).
"5 J. HENDERSON, PROBATE PRAcTICE § 1366 (2d ed. 1950).
" Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 Iowa L. REv. 376 n.5 (1960).
"
9E.g., FED. R. Cwv. P. 17(c); N.C. SuPnE. CT. R. 16, 17.
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-64, 1-65.1 (1967).
'
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-65.2 (1967).
[Vol. 48
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or other entities ;22 for missing persons when a receiver is sought to be
appointed ;21 and for insane or incompetent non-residents having prop-
erty within the state.2 4  The clerk of superior court may appoint a
guardian ad litem for a person who is committed to a state-supervised
hospital if its superintendent provides a certificate declaring the person
to be insane or mentally retarded.25
Although North Carolina statutes specify the situations in which
guardians ad litem may be appointed, they do not contain any procedure
for appointing them or next friends. Instead, the procedure is controlled
by rules 16 and 17 of the superior courts,26 which do not contain any
provision about the two issues raised in HaginsS--(1) whether the
plaintiff was entitled to actual notice of the proposed appointment of a
next friend and (2) whether she was entitled to an opportunity to be
heard upon the competency issue before the trial judge could properly ap-
point a next friend.28
There is case law in North Carolina indicating that notice and an
opportunity to be heard are constitutional requirements in all cases; how-
ever, no case specifically mentions notice to allegedly incompetent per-
sons.29 One case has held that an alleged incompetent was entitled to be
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-65.3 (1967).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2(c) (1966).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §35-3.1 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-3 (1966). For a discussion of North Carolina commit-
ment procedures and due process see Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill,
31 N.C.L. REv. 274 (1958).
-' N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 16:
In all cases where it is proposed that infants shall sue by their next friend,
the court shall appoint such next friend, upon the written application of a
reputable, disinterested person closely connected with such infant; but if
such person will not apply, then, upon the like application of some reputable
citizen; and the court shall make such appointment only after due inquiry
as to the fitness of the person to be appointed.
This rule also governs the appointment of guardians ad litem for persons other
than infants. Abbott v. Hancock, 123 N.C. 99, 31 S.E. 268 (1898).
N.C. SUPER. CT. R. 17. "All motions for a guardian ad litem shall be made in
writing, and the court shall appoint such guardian only after due inquiry as to
the fitness of the person to be appointed, and such guardian must file an answer
in every case."
27 Possibly because infancy and incompetency are the two major disabilities
to which these rules of practice are applicable. Infancy is seldom disputed, and an
incompetent who owns property normally has a general guardian to represent him.
2 Hagins v. Redevelopment Comm'n, 275 N.C. 90, 98, 165 S.E.2d 490, 495
(1969).
" See Collins v. Highway Comm'n, 237 N.C. 277, 74 S.E.2d 709 (1953) (con-
demnation proceeding); National Sur. Corp. v. Sharpe, 232 N.C. 98, 59 S.E.2d
593 (1950) (notice to creditors in insolvency proceeding) ; In re State v. Gordon,
225 N.C. 241, 34 S.E.2d 414 (1945) (notice to owners of liquor confiscated under
state laws).
19691
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heard upon timely objection,"° but an inquisition to determine competency
was not a condition precedent to the appointment of a guardian ad litem
or next friend.31 The right to a hearing is of little value if there is no
requirement that the alleged incompetent must receive notice. In fact,
under the practice followed by the North Carolina superior courts, notice
almost never reaches the ward."
It was in this context that the Supreme Court of North Carolina de-
cided Hagins. The court first looked at the jurisdictional facts that allow
appointment of guardians ad litem and next friends and determined that
Mrs. Hagins should have been non compos mentis if a next friend was ap-
pointed. The court also noted, as pointed out above, that neither section
1-64 of the North Carolina General Statutes nor North Carolina Superior
Court Rule 16 contains any provision for notice or for an adjudication of
incompetency where there is a dispute. Relying upon the history of
legislative and judicial protections of the right of one accused of incom-
petency to traverse the allegations, the court concluded that such person
was entitled to notice as in the case of an inquisition under section 35-2
of the North Carolina General Statutes. The supreme court held that if
the person upon notice asserts his competency, in the absence of an
emergency situation the trial court must then proceed under the lunacy
statute 3 and hold an inquisition. 4 Since Mrs. Hagins had neither notice
nor an opportunity to be heard, the court deemed void the appointment
of the next friend and the subsequent judgments.
Requirements of notice and hearing set forth in Hagins will ap-
parently govern the procedure for appointing guardians ad litem after
the new North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure become effective in
January, 1970. The case will be of continuing validity since the new
rules, while repealing superior court rules 16 and 17, fail to provide for
"° Moore v. Lewis, 250 N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959).
" Id.; Smith v. Smith, 106 N.C. 498, 11 S.E. 188 (1890). But see Tt re Wil-
son, 257 N.C. 593, 597, 126 S.E.2d 489, 492 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
3" In an interview with the writer, several superior court judges indicated that
proceedings to appoint a next friend or guardian ad litem were pro forma in that
the clerk of court or judge would grant such appointment on affidavits, without
notice to the proposed ward, and would rely on the guardian ad litem's verified
answer to set forth the details of the ward's incompetency. The judges stated
that they had no problem in this respect and that if at some point in the litigation
the alleged non compos mentis objected to such appointment, he would be given
an opportunity to be heard. Interview with four superior court judges in Chapel
Hill, N. C., on Sept. 5, 1969. See also Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 556, 109
S.E. 568, 570 (1921).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-2 (1966).
"
4Accord, Borough of East Paterson v. Karkus, 136 N.J. Eq. 286, 41 A.2d
332 (Ct. Ch. 1945); Graham v. Graham, 40 Wash. 2d 64, 240 P.2d 564 (1952).
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notice and an opportunity to be heard or contest an issue for infants, in-
competents, and others in proceedings to appoint a guardian ad litem. 5
Hagins is particularly significant for the future for its treatment of
notice. The court indicated that not only are alleged incompetents (as in
Hagins) entitled to notice before appointment of a guardian ad litem,
but also any person for whom a guardian ad litem is proposed is entitled
to such notice in the absence of an emergency.3" The court stated:
[A] person for whom a next friend or guardian ad litem is proposed
is entitled to notice as in case of a [sic] inquisition of lunacy under
G.S. Section 35-2. This statute does not specify the time, but by
analogy to G.S. Section 1-581, ten days notice would be appropriate
unless the court, for good cause should prescribe a shorter period.s
Any interpretation that this rule applies only to persons allegedly non
compos mentis is illogical because the court before laying it down already
had discussed notice to them.8  Thus the requirements of Hagins would
seem to apply to all cases in which a guardian ad litem can be appointed
under any North Carolina statute.39
If this interpretation is correct, infants would have a right to notice
if they are old enough to comprehend it. Moreover, when a guardian ad
litem is proposed for a person who already has a general guardian,4" the
potential ward still would be entitled to notice. Hagins may even require
that when a guardian ad litem is to be appointed for non-existent trusts,
corporations, or other entities under Rule 17(b) of the North Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, some or all persons who will be a part of or
have an interest in the nonexistent entity be given notice.
Hagins would also affect section 28A-2(c) of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which provides for appointment of a guardian ad litem
1 N.C.R. Civ. P. 17 (N.C. GEx. STAT. § 1A-4 (Advance Legis. Pamp. No. 7
1969) ). The separate terminology of next friend and guardian ad litem is dropped;
guardian ad litem is used for both plaintiff and defendant. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 1-64, 1-65.1 to -65.3 are incorporated into Rule 17 without significant change.
Is "In an emergency, when it is necessary, pendente lite, to safeguard the
property of a person non compos mentis whose incompetency has not been ad-judicated, the protection of the court may be invoked in his behalf by one acting
as next friend." 275 N.C. at 103, 165 S.E.2d at 499.
37 Id. at 102, 165 S.E.2d at 498.
58Id.
o See note 20 and p. 94 supra.
'o N.C.R. Civ. P. 17(b) (3) (N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-4 (Advance Legis. Pamp.
No. 7 1969)). ". . . a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person may
be appointed in any case when it is deemed by the court in which the action is
pending expedient to have the infant or insane or incompetent person so repre-
sented notwithstanding such person may have a general or testamentary guardian."
1969]
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to represent a missing person in an action to appoint a receiver. While
section 28A-5 provides for notice by publication to the missing person,
it fails to require notice of the appointment of the guardian ad litem.41
Assuredly, it is most difficult to conceive of one being able to notify a
missing person, but under Hagins he must be notified; and constitu-
tionally notice must be given in a manner reasonably calculated to inform
him of the proceedings.4"
A further problem created by Hagins is that the decision requires
notice to be served upon the alleged incompetent. Even where a person
is a known incompetent but has not yet been so adjudged, Hagins would
require notice to him before a guardian can be appointed. In Covey v.
Town of Somers,43 the United States Supreme Court held that notice
to a person known to be an incompetent and without the protection of a
guardian does not measure up to constitutional standards.44 The potential
impasse created by the two cases yields to common sense, but it is diffi-
cult to solve mechanically. Perhaps Covey simply adds the further require-
ment of notifying someone other than the alleged incompetent, such as a
close friend or relative, while sustaining the Hagins requirement of notice.
If, after receiving notice, the alleged incompetent objects to the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem, Hagins requires (in the absence of an
emergency) an inquisition similar to that in section 35-2 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, which provides for a jury of twelve men to
inquire into the person's competency. Should the inquisition reveal that
the party is not incompetent to manage his own affairs but is incompetent
as to the particular subject matter of the litigation, then a guardian ad
litem cannot be appointed. 5 Thus Hagins, while no doubt providing ad-
ditional safeguards for alleged incompetents, fails to protect a person
who is only mentally unable to comprehend his interests in the litigation
even though he has retained counsel.
Where the inquisition finds the proposed ward incompetent, another
" See McCall, Estates of Missing Persons in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV.
275 (1966).
'
2 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
' 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). "An
elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which
is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-
stances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them
an opportunity to present their objections." Id. at 314.
"'275 N.C. at 104, 165 S.E.2d at 499. "[W]e understand the word affairs
to encompass a person's entire property and business-not just one transaction or
one piece of property to which he may have a unique attachment."
[Vol. 48
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problem, which the court failed to examine, is raised: what is the effect
of the determination of incompetency? This question was left unanswered
because the court did not specify that the determination should be a bind-
ing judicial decree as in the case of the lunacy proceeding under section
35-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes. A person found incom-
petent under section 35-2 loses power over his estate, and a guardian is
appointed for him. If incompetency is adjudged in an inquisition proceed-
ing specified by the decision in Hagins, a guardian ad litem rather than a
general guardian will be appointed, unless the determination is given the
effect of a binding judicial decree under section 35-2. But a guardian
ad litem has no power to administer an incompetent's estate.40 The lack
of a general guardian might well mean that the person adjudged incom-
petent will be unable to conduct his affairs or deal in business with others
due to their fear of his transactions being deemed void.
Another, and perhaps the most significant, aspect of Hagins is the
court's discussion of the effect of failure to comply with the prescribed
requirements of notice. Prior to this decision, an irregularity in the ap-
pointment of a guardian ad litem or next friend was considered a pro-
cedural rather than a jurisdictional defect so that the judgment was
voidable and could only be attacked directly by the parties to it.47 The
attacking party had to show that his rights had been prejudiced before
the judgment could be set aside.4" But in Hagins the court considered the
lack of notice and an opportunity for a hearing as jurisdictional defects
that left the lower court's judgment completely void rather than simply
voidable :" "[T]he order appointing Franks as her next friend was void
and his settlements of her actions, notwithstanding they were approved
by the court, are not binding upon her." If void, a judgment rendered
without notice or an opportunity to be heard can be collaterally attacked
by persons other than the ward.
Although the result in Hagins is unquestionably just, the case leaves
many questions unanswered. Until these problems are clarified, the care-
ful lawyer should make certain in all cases where a guardian ad litem is
to be appointed that all reasonable means are used to inform the person
for whom the proposed appointment is to be made and that an oppor-
tunity for him to be heard is provided. ODEs L. STROUPE, JR.
" Teele v. Kerr, 261 N.C. 148, 134 S.E.2d 126 (1964).
'" It re Barker, 210 N.C. 617, 188 S.E. 205 (1936); Tate v. Mott, 96 N.C.
19, 2 S.E. 176 (1887).
" Moore v. Lewis, 250 N.C. 77, 108 S.E.2d 26 (1959).
,1 275 N.C. at 102, 103, 165 S.E.2d at 498.
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